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We present a field experiment designed to examine the discriminatory motives of an
understudied demographic: the poorest people in England. Subjects are first asked
to divide £10 between two strangers, and then play a £10 dictator game with an-
other stranger. We subtly vary the ethnicity of the receivers by providing subjects
with surnames randomly drawn from the electoral register, including treatments that
allow us to parse behaviour into either in–group favouritism or out–group negativity,
an important behavioural distinction that is typically overlooked in the discrimina-
tion literature. Our results suggest that the observed discriminatory attitudes are
the result of out-group negativity rather than in-group favouritism. We advance the
literature on discrimination through the estimation of a structural model of group–
contingent social preferences, which we exploit to perform counterfactual simulations.
Our results provide insights into the behaviour of this unique demographic and pro-
vide a rationale for why they may support discriminatory policies in their voting
behaviour.
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“They’re not coming to this country if
I’m president”
— Donald J. Trump, 2015
1 Introduction
Donald Trump, the recently inaugurated 45th President of the United States, was
branded a bigot and a racist for the proposed policy of banning Muslims from entering
the United States during his presential campaign (Milibank, 2015). His comments
were described as “hate speech,” and the United Kingdom’s House of Commons
debated banning him from entering the country after a petition calling for his ban
was signed by 500,000 people.1 Similar anti–Muslim sentiment was at the heart of
the recent election of the London Mayor, Sadiq Kahn and the ‘Vote Leave’ campaign
during the British referendum on EU membership. For example, those standing
in opposition to Sadiq Kahn made a number of allegations linking him to Muslim
extremist groups, and Vote Leave directed significant attention to potential increased
immigration from Muslim countries in order to promote anti–EU sentiment.2
The similarity between the Trump and Vote Leave campaigns is likely not a coinci-
dence, as supporters of both Trump and Vote Leave appear to share similar views. As
highlighted by a number of pre and post–referendum polls, voters most likely to have
supported Vote Leave are white, have low levels of education and earn low incomes.3
The same appears to be true for the supporters of Donald Trump (Thompson, 2016).
Further, surveys suggest that 30% of British voters would support policies that re-
duced the Muslim population (Townsend, 2012), and around 27% believe Islam is
incompatible with the values of British democracy. This latter view is found to be
correlated with respondents’ incomes and level of education (Page, 2009).
However, little is known about why individuals from this particular demographic
might support policies that discriminate against those with Islamic heritage. This is
largely because there is little research into the behaviour of the poorer, less educated
population. Previous work into discrimination against Muslims has typically focused
on better educated and wealthier individuals that are less likely to be supporters of
such policies. For example, Ahmed (2010b) reports evidence of discrimination in trust
and dictator games against non–Europeans in an experiment utilising Swedish uni-
versity students. Ahmed & Hammarstedt (2008) find that landlords in the Swedish
1The petition, parliamentary debate and discussion can be viewed through the UK’s Parliamentary
Petition website: https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/114003.
2A number of newspaper articles demonstrate this point. For example, Hinsliff (2016) reports on
Sadiq Kahn’s competitors trying to link him to an ISIS sympathiser. The former UKIP party leader,
and prominent figure in the Vote Leave campaign, Nigel Farage, posed with a billboard poster of Muslim
refugees with the slogan, ‘Breaking Point’ (Wright, 2016), and Vote Leave ‘appealed to prejudice’ by
claiming Turkey was about to join the EU and that its citizens posed a threat to UK national security
(Boffey & Helm, 2016).
3Three separate studies support this. The Lord Ashcroft Poll information on voter demographics:
http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/; the Telegraph newspaper
poll: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016 /06/22/eu-referendum-which-type-of-person-wants-to-leave-
and-who-will-b/; and a Guardian report: https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2016/jun/24/the-
areas-and-demographics-where-the-brexit-vote-was-won.
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housing market discriminate against tenants with Muslim sounding names in com-
parison to ‘native’ names. Ahmed et al. (2009) find that small business sellers are
less likely to contact potential buyers if they have Muslim sounding names. Kaas
& Manger (2012) report similar evidence of discrimination by hiring committess in
the German labour market towards those with Turkish sounding names. Booth et al.
(2012) report comparable results from the Australian labour market against those
with names of Middle Eastern origin. However, the strategic nature of the interac-
tions in these studies means that individuals may be using ethnic stereotypes in order
to inform their decisions, making preference (Becker, 1971) and statistical (Phelps,
1972) explanations of discrimination difficult to disentangle.
In contrast to field studies, lab experiments provide a more tightly controlled
environment in which statistical and taste–based explanations of discrimination can
be more easily parsed. Experimenters have employed a range of strategic and non–
strategic games in order to distinguish between the two competing explanations, and
also to develop new behavioural theories of discrimination. Recent studies suggest
that individuals’ social preferences are group–contingent, i.e. that the extent to which
individuals care about others depends on the degree to which they identify with them
(Akerlof & Kranton, 2000; Chen & Li, 2009). Individuals have been found to behave
more charitably (Chen & Li, 2009; Whitt & Wilson, 2007), cooperatively (Drouvelis
& Nosenzo, 2013; Falk & Zehnder, 2013; Goette et al., 2006; Ruffle & Sosis, 2006) and
coordinate more efficiently (Chen & Chen, 2011) when interacting with those they
perceive as the ‘in–group’, in comparison to the ‘out–group’. A stylised interpretation
of these findings is that individuals exhibit favouritism towards the in–group, rather
than negativity towards the out–group, what Bernhard et al. (2006) call parochialism.
As noted by Becker (1971), this is an important behavioural distinction, and as
suggested by Ahmed (2007), many studies that conclude that individuals exhibit
in–group favouritism omit a treatment where interactions are ‘group neutral’ (Falk
& Zehnder, 2013; Fershtman & Gneezy, 2001; Goette et al., 2006; Ruffle & Sosis,
2006; Whitt & Wilson, 2007), and so are unable to parse behaviour into in–group
favouritism or out–group negativity.
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the potential motives underpinning
the behaviour of an understudied demographic: poor and less educated white-British
individuals. We focus on this demographic because, as previously discussed, opin-
ion polls suggest them to be most supportive of discriminatory policies. This paper
aims to determine if their support for anti–Muslim policies could be a result of taste–
based discrimination (Becker, 1971). This is achieved using a door–to–door field
experiment conducted in the poorest areas in England, two housing estates in the
town of Rochdale. The residents of these estates were chosen because they are highly
representative of the demographic of interest: they are white, have received little
formal education and have very low incomes. Many of those who took part in our
experiment live on incomes as low as £57 per week, with some subjects living in
neighbourhoods that endure unemployment rates of 100%. The experiment was con-
ducted almost two years prior to the actual UK referendum, and around 18 months
before the announcement that a referendum would be held. Analysing post referen-
dum voting data shows that the voter turn out in Rochdale was 65% with 60% voting
to leave the European Union. This compares with the national average voter turnout
of 72%, of which 52% voted to leave.
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Subjects were first asked to make distributional choices in Other–Other games,
where they had to divide £10 between two strangers. Following the social psychology
experiments of Turner (1978), this was done in order to make their ethnicity salient.
They then played a single Dictator Game, dividing £10 between themselves and a
receiver. Similar to Fershtman & Gneezy (2001), and the lost letter experiments of
Ahmed (2010a), the 3×1 between–subject design subtly varies the ethnicity of the
individuals that subjects are allocating money to by providing them with surnames
taken from the local electoral register.4 The surnames were categorised into either
English or Muslim ethnic origin using the taxonomy of Mateos et al. (2007). These
allocation decisions are then compared to the decisions from an Anonymous baseline
treatment, where the receiver’s surname is withheld, allowing us to distinguish be-
tween in–group favouritism and out–group negativity. As we study a non–standard
subject pool, the experiment satisfies the artefactual field experiment criteria of Har-
rison & List (2004).
In the Dictator Game, we find that subjects give around £5 to receivers with
surnames of English origin, £2 to those with surnames of Muslim origin and £5 to
those in the Anonymous treatment. Individuals with surnames of Muslim origin are
treated worse than someone who is Anonymous, whilst those with surnames of En-
glish origin are not treated more favourably. Thus, in contrast to the conclusions of
the majority of the literature we find no evidence of in–group favouritism, but instead
report evidence of out–group negativity. This is a particularly interesting finding, as
anti–immigration and nationalist groups often associated with this demographic em-
ploy slogans or names that focus on the in–group, and imply that they are promoting
in–group favouritism, rather than supporting out–group negativity.5
To link our empirical analysis to behavioural theory, we assume that subjects give
in the Dictator Game because they have social preferences, and that these prefer-
ences are group–contingent (Chen & Li, 2009). Structural parameter estimates of the
Cox et al. (2007) social preference utility function reveal that the utility weight that
dictators place on the payoff of a receiver varies with the ethnicity of the receiver.
This weight is an astounding 87% smaller when the receiver has a surname of Mus-
lim origin in comparison to the weight given to receivers’ payoffs in the Anonymous
treatment and to those with surnames of English origin. In Section 6 we conduct a
counterfactual simulation using the preference parameters we estimate, and discuss
how they could provide an explanation for our subjects’ potential support of discrim-
inatory policies. Our conclusions may also provide insight into the results of Ahmed
& Hammarstedt (2008), Booth et al. (2012), and the discrimination faced by Muslims
reported in the press.6
In the Other–Other games we find that when allocating money between two in-
dividuals with surnames of contrasting ethnic origin, one English and one Muslim,
subjects allocate around £1 more to the individual with the surname of English origin
4Experiments into gender differences conducted by Holm (2000) preceed those of Fershtman & Gneezy
(2001) and use a similar method, but utilise forenames rather than surnames in order to study gender.
5For example, consider the right–wing British organisation, Britain First, that promotes nationalist
policies, and other campaigns in the UK such as ‘Buy British’ or phrases such as ‘British Jobs for British
Workers’.
6For example, Syal & Topping (2014) report on taxi customers in Rochdale requesting ‘local’ (white
British) drivers over the phone, rather than Asian–Muslim drivers.
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regardless of the ordering of the surnames. Although this result resonates with the
minimal group literature (Turner, 1978; Chen & Li, 2009), we cannot determine if
this behaviour is driven by in–group favouritism or out–group negativity as there is
no group–neutral baseline from which to compare behaviour.
While discrimination against minorities is not a new finding per se, this study
makes a number of contributions. First, we contribute to the discrimination literature
by examining the behaviour of an understudied population: deprived, white–British
individuals, the demographic most likely to support discriminatory policies. Second,
we provide the first evidence of the potential motives underpinning the behaviour
of this demographic. Finally, we provide a potential behavioural rationale for why
these individuals might discriminate by modelling ethnic discrimination as being a
consequence of group–contingent social preferences.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives details of the
study population, Section 3 outlines the experimental design, Section 4 presents the
results, Section 5 estimates a structural model, Section 6 provides a counterfactual
analysis, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Subject pool
The subjects in our experiment are drawn from two population areas, Falinge and
Kirkholt, two housing estates situated in Rochdale, England, a town located in a
wider region that has a recent history of ethnic tensions (Carter & Midlane, 2012;
Syal & Topping, 2014). The Rochdale area has an electorate of 156,621, and in the
referendum had a voter turnout of 65%. Of the 103,319 registered voters who turned
out to vote, 60% voted to leave the European Union. Whilst turnout was lower than
the national average (71.8%), the number of voters in favour of leaving was much
higher (52%).
The extent of unemployment in the areas of interest is most evident from the
English Indices of Deprivation, a five yearly publication from the UK Government’s
Office of National Statistics (ONS). The report ranks small highly localised popu-
lations in terms of relative deprivation. At the time the study took place (Summer
2014) the Falinge and Kirkholt housing estates were ranked in the top 0.3% of the
most income and employment deprived populations in the country. The Falinge es-
tate was ranked first out of 32,482. It was determined to be the most deprived area
in both these domains.7
Table 1 provides information on the housing estates we study. Each estate is
divided into different areas by the UK Census, and the Table outlines the number of
households, the percentage of people without qualifications, the percentage of people
out of work and simplified ethnic demographics for each of these Census Areas. It is
evident that a significant number of residents are out of work, and a large proportion
have not obtained any formal qualifications. Deprivation rankings in the income and
employment domains are given in the final two columns.
Although a majority of residents from the two housing estates are white British
7In the latest 2015 report, other locations have become relatively more deprived. However, Falinge




Estate Census No. Claiming No White Income Employment
Area Households Benefita Educationb
Falinge
F1 177 85% 31% 40%
1st 1st
F2 215 100%* 44% 60%
Kirkholt
K1 132 75% 44% 82%
98th 50th
K2 120 65% 31% 66%
K3 150 85% 36% 79%
K4 136 55% 36% 80%
Source: Office of National Statistics, English Indices of Deprivation 2010, UK Census 2011 and
own calculations. The Output Area codes used within the Census are removed for anonymity
reasons. ∗The Census reports this figure as 120%, which is potentially attributed to fraudulent
benefit claims. aPercent of population claiming out of work benefits. bPercent of population
with no formal qualifications. cIncome and employment deprivation ranks out of 32,482. Higher
ranks imply greater levels of deprivation.
Table 1: Population Demographics
nationals, Table 1 highlights that a large number of residents are from non-white
minority ethnic groups. In one area in Falinge (area F1), non–white residents con-
stitute a majority of the population (60%). In contrast, far fewer minority ethnic
groups are present in the population of the Kirkholt Estate. The non-white pop-
ulations in Rochdale are predominantly categorised as being Asian: although this
category is very broad, incorporating many different ethnicities, the vast majority of
this population in Rochdale are of Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin, with the second
most commonly stated religious belief after Christianity being Islam.
3 Experimental design
We study the other–regarding behaviour of white British nationals and how their be-
haviour is influenced by the English and Muslim ethnic origins of those they interact
with. This was achieved by conducting a door-to-door artefactual field experiment
administered to the population areas outlined in Section 2. All subjects first com-
pleted a series of Other–Other Games, dividing £10 between two other people (Part
1). They then played a single Dictator Game, where they allocated £10 between
themselves and a receiver (Part 2). All choices were made in whole pounds. Subjects
then completed a post experimental questionnaire.8
To vary the ethnicity of the individuals that subjects are allocating money to,
we provided them with their surnames. In an attempt to avoid any experimenter
bias in surname selection, we classified surnames taken from the Edited Electoral
Register for the Rochdale area into different groups of ‘ethnic and cultural’ origin
using the ‘Cultural, Ethnic and Linguistic’ taxonomy of Mateos et al. (2007). Only
those surnames which were classified as ‘Western European, English’ in origin (for
example, Smith) and those of ‘Muslim’ origin (for example, Islam) were used.9
8All experimental materials are included in Appendix A.
9These names are examples, and were not necessarily used within the study. The surnames, and actual
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Households that answered the door were read out a fixed script that outlined who
the caller was, and were asked if they would like to take part in an ‘Economic Decision
Making Study’. They were told they would receive £2.50 for taking part, and that
they had the opportunity to earn additional money. If a resident agreed to take part
the experiment was conducted at the door–step. Once finished, subjects were paid
in cash. The order in which streets were approached was randomised and only one
person per household was permitted to take part.
Subjects were told that once the study was completed those they were allocating
money to would receive payment in cash through the post, which they did. Subjects
were aware that they were not allocating money directly to their neighbours as the
housing estates studied make up only a tiny fraction of the entire town of Rochdale.
Subjects were also told that they were allocating money to people who would not be
required to make a decision, and that these people were not even aware that they
were involved in the study. Any money they received would be a surprise. This
was emphasised in an attempt to mitigate the effect that subjects’ first order beliefs
(their belief about the receiver’s choice) and second order beliefs (their belief about
the receiver’s expectation of their choice) might have on their behaviour. These
beliefs have been highlighted as important for reciprocity in a number of studies
(Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000). In order to control for the
effects stemming from the commonality of social group affiliation (Guala et al., 2013),
subjects were assured they would remain anonymous to the receivers and the receiver
would not be informed about the dictators’ identity.
In Part 1 subjects were asked to allocate £10 between two other people (‘Person A’
and ‘Person B ’), but were not able to allocate any money to themselves, and therefore
received no payment for their decisions. They were required to do this under three
schemes in which they were provided with the surnames of the two people they were
allocating money to. Subjects completed what we label an In–In, Out–Out and In–
Out scheme, in a random order. In the In–In scheme, subjects allocated £10 between
two people with surnames of English origin and in the Out–Out scheme the money
was allocated between two people with surnames of Muslim origin. In the In–Out
scheme money was allocated between one person with a surname of English origin, and
one with a surname of Muslim origin, the order of which was randomised between
subjects to control for any order effects. Subjects were informed that one scheme
would be selected for payment at random and that the two individuals from that
scheme would receive payment through the post. Subjects did not learn the scheme
that was selected until the experiment was completed. Part 1 is motivated by the
minimal–group findings of Turner (1978), who reports that Other–Other allocation
choices can enhance the salience of subjects’ identities in subsequent decisions.10
In Part 2 subjects were asked to allocate £10 between themselves and a receiver,
an individual randomly selected from the Edited Electoral Register. The between–
subject design varied whether the receiver had a surname of English origin (English
Treatment), a surname of Muslim origin (Muslim Treatment) or if the surname was
withheld (Anonymous Treatment). Each subject was randomly assigned to a treat-
ment, and the surname was unknown to the experimenter. Once they had made
examples, are not given for anonymity reasons.
10This may not be a robust finding, as Chen & Li (2009) found that Other–Other games have no effect
on identity salience.
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their choice they were paid in cash. A £10 endowment was chosen as it is the ‘stan-
dard’ dictator amount (Engel, 2011), and thus allows for a comparison with previous
studies.
To elicit background characteristics, subjects completed a post experimental sur-
vey and self–reported a number of characteristics. However, the main survey question
of interest was one which aimed to measure group attachment and to check the exper-
imental manipulations were successful. In the post experimental survey, in a manner
similar to Yamagishi & Kiyonari (2000), subjects were asked, ‘How close did you feel
to your match in Part 2, based on their surname alone? ’.11 Subjects were asked
to make a choice on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being ‘Not at all ’ and 10 being
‘Very much so’. If ethnicity is important to subjects, then this measure of Closeness
should register increases (or decreases) relative to the Anonymous baseline.12 Table
2 provides a summary of the experimental design.
Treatment Part 1 No Surname English Muslim Survey Observations
Anonymous X X X 38
English X X X 42
Muslim X X X 42
Table 2: Experimental Design – Part 2
The experiment was conducted between the hours of 12pm and 6pm during the
summer of 2014. A total of 16 full days across 4 weeks were required to collect all the
observations. The experiment was conducted by a single experimenter, who was a
white British male. A total of 828 individual addresses from the two housing estates
were approached, 341 residents answered the door, and 132 agreed to take part.13
We were unable to recruit any additional residents: of the 487 addresses that did not
answer the door, all were approached an additional time at a later date. The 209
addresses which refused to take part were not approached again.14
4 Results
This section outlines the experimental results. A number of common features are
present throughout: where non–parametric tests are given, the p–value and test used
are both presented in parentheses. Unless otherwise stated, the null hypothesis is
always that there is no difference in behaviour between treatments and all reported
11In the Anonymous Treatment subjects were asked ‘How close did you feel to your match? ’
12This question is a variation of a question used by Turner (1978), “How much did you like the people
in your group?”, or of that used by Chen & Li (2009), “Please rate how closely attached you felt to your
own group throughout the experiment”.
13While this participation rate seems low, it is comparable to the response rate of students to email
communication inviting them to participate in laboratory experiments. At the FEELE laboratory at the
University of Exeter, we frequently send out six email invitations in order to get a single participant.
14We do not include the responses from 10 residents who were either non–white, non–British or both.
However, these 10 residents were paid for their decisions, and their allocations were sent to the receivers.
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tests are two sided.15 Only one person per household took part and each individual
observation is treated as independent. As the experiment was conducted over four
weeks, subjects may have heard about the study from neighbours or through social
media, causing behaviour to differ over time. No evidence is found of a trend in
behaviour over the course of the experiment (p = 0.76, Cuzick’s Wilcoxon–like test
for trend) (Cuzick, 1985) so all observations are pooled.16
4.1 Dictator game
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the subjects’ choices and self reported demo-
graphics.17 Figure 1 displays box plots of amounts given in each treatment.
% of subjects: Median Mean Mean
Treatment Male Employed No Education Income Closenessa Amount Givenb
Anonymous 57% 26% 26% ≤£10,000 2.95 4.05
(2.78) (2.88)
English 43% 22% 44% ≤£10,000 3.78 4.88
(2.78) (3.15)
Muslim 35% 19% 29% ≤£10,000 2.61 2.62
(2.65) (2.47)
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Male, Employed, No Education, Income
and Closeness summarize the self–reported answers to the post experimental questionnaire.
aCloseness was measured on a Likert Scale as the answer to the question, “How close did
you feel to your match (based on their surname alone)?” with 1 being “Not at all” and 10
being “Very much so.” bAmount given in the dictator game in pounds.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Result 1 (Out–Group Negativity): In the Dictator Game subjects give around
half as much to those with surnames of Muslim origin in comparison to those with
surnames of English origin, and in comparison to those who are Anonymous.
Support. Table 4 presents the test statistics and p–values for the pairwise com-
parisons of distributions and medians between treatments. As shown, no significant
differences are reported when comparing how much was given to those with surnames
of English origin to how much was given to those who are Anonymous. However, when
comparing giving to those with surnames of Muslim origin to giving to those with
surnames of English origin and to those who are Anonymous, significant differences
are found in both distributions and medians.
15We use non–parametric Robust Rank Order tests instead of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests following
the analysis of Feltovich (2003).
16While this test is commonly used in the medical literature, it is less common in the economics literature.
The Cuzick Test is an extension of the Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum Test which allows to test for trend across three
or more ordered groups.
17Randomisation into treatments was done by putting instructions relating to each treatment into a
random order. At the door, the experimenter then used the instructions in that random order. See



















Note:  represents the mean. Thick horizontal bars represent the median.
Figure 1: Box Plots of Amounts Given in the Dictator
Game by Treatment
Comparison Alternative Hypothesis Test Statistic p–value
Distributionsa
HA: English 6= Anonymous χ2=1.366 0.266
HA: Muslim 6= Anonymous χ2=5.541 0.019 **
HA: Muslim 6= English χ2=11.637 0.001 ***
Mediansb
HA: English 6= Anonymous Ú=-1.115 0.265
HA: Muslim 6= Anonymous Ú=2.341 0.019 **
HA: Muslim 6= English Ú=3.63 0.000 ***
Note: In each comparison the null hypothesis is always that there is no
difference between treatments. ***, ** denote significance at the 1% and 5%
level.
a Compared using Kruskall–Wallis Tests. Test statistics reported with ties.
b Compared using Robust Rank Order Tests. The p-values are identical for the
equivalent Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum Tests.
Table 4: Pairwise Comparisons of Dictator Giving
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Dependent variable: Amount Given
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Englisha 1.169 1.16 0.423 -1.51
(0.907) (0.91) (0.852) (1.323)
Muslima -2.051** -2.072** -2.06** -2.58**
(0.919) (0.938) (0.891) (1.258)
Male -0.165 -0.541 -0.529
(0.757) (0.691) (0.679)


















Constant 3.846*** 3.878*** 0.917 1.592
(0.657) (0.847) (1.143) (1.192)
Observations 122 122 96 96
Note: Observations left censored at 0 and right censored at 10.
Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The number of observations dif-
fers between models due to missing entries. Identical estimates
are obtained with robust standard errors. aEnglish and Muslim
correspond to dummies for the English and Muslim treatments
respectively.
Variables: Male, 1 if male, 0 otherwise; Area, 1 if Kirkholt, 0
otherwise; Employed, 1 if employed, 0 otherwise; High School,
A-level and Degree, take 1 if that education level is the highest
obtained by the subject, and 0 otherwise. Income: self reported
income. Closeness is self reported level of closeness: with 1 being
“Not at all” and 10 being “Very much so”.
Table 5: Determinants of Amount Given – Tobit Regressions
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Table 5 presents estimates from a number of Tobit regressions. In each regression
the amount given is the dependent variable, the Anonymous treatment is taken as
the baseline and we include dummies for the English and Muslim treatments. To ex-
amine the robustness of the estimates, in each subsequent model additional dummies
which take values of 1 for each of the following (and zero otherwise) are also included:
if the subject was male (Male), employed (Employed), educated to GCSE level (High
school), A-level (A-level), University level (Degree) and if the subject was from the
Kirkholt estate (Area); when the dummies controlling for education are all zero, the
subject has no formal qualifications. Income (Income) and the subjects’ self reported
level of Closeness (Closeness) are also included, along with Closeness interacted with
the treatment dummies. Supporting the non–parametric analysis, Table 5 outlines
how the coefficient on the Muslim dummy is always estimated to be negative and
significant (p < 0.05, in all regressions), with its magnitude robust to specification
changes.
Although Result 1 resonates with the results of previous experiments, it does
not support the typically reported result that subjects exhibit in–group favouritism.
Many previous studies do not include a group–neutral baseline treatment from which
to compare behaviour, with Chen & Li (2009) and Chen & Chen (2011) being notable
exceptions. For example, Ruffle & Sosis (2006) suggest that they find, “strong in–
group favouritism in cooperation” because individuals treat in–group and out–group
members differently. Falk & Zehnder (2013) frame the results of their field experiment
in terms of, “in–group effects” rather than out–group effects. Similarly, Ioannou et al.
(2015) posit that one of their experimental treatments is, “sufficient to invoke an
in–group bias” in trust and dictator games, when only comparing behaviour from
in–group and out–group interactions. As Goette et al. (2006) highlight, in–group
favouritism and out–group negativity produce the same predicted outcome, and are
indistinguishable when a baseline or group–neutral comparison is excluded.
One explanation for why we do not observe in–group favouritism could be that
the English treatment is not a strong enough experimental manipulation, or it was
unsuccessful in inducing an in–group sense of identity. To shed light on this, we
examine self–reported levels of group attachment, or Closeness, as is standard in the
literature (Chen & Li, 2009; Ioannou et al., 2015; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000).
Subjects are found to report feeling closest to those with surnames of English
origin, with Closeness in the English treatment found to be significantly different
from that in the Anonymous and Muslim treatments (p = 0.07 and p = 0.011,
Robust Rank Order Tests). We find this even though behaviour is found to be
identical in both the English and Anonymous treatments, as outlined in Result 1. No
differences in levels of Closeness are reported when comparing the Muslim treatment
to the Anonymous treatment (p = 0.65, Robust Rank Order Test). This suggests the
English treatment was successful in inducing an in–group sense of identity.
An alternative explanation may relate to the implicit and explicit attitudes of the
subjects. Subjects giving to an Anonymous receiver may have unconsciously believed
the receiver was ‘like them’, and therefore the same as someone with a surname of
English origin. Only when they are explicitly prompted to consider how ‘close’ they
feel to someone with a surname of English origin do they exhibit favouritism. This is
likely captured by the significant, but small effect of the interaction between Closeness
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and the English treatment (Closeness×English) reported in Table 5 (p = 0.078,
model iv). Thus, at least in this setting, in–group favouritism is only observed when
explicitly prompted.
4.2 Other–other games
Prior to the Dictator Game all subjects played three Other–Other games where they
were required to allocate money between two other people, Person A and Person B.
They made their choices under three schemes in a random order: the In–In, Out–Out
and In–Out scheme. In the In–Out scheme, subjects completed either an In–Out or
Out–In ordering. As shown in the experimental instructions given in Appendix A,
Person A’s surname was presented first and to the left, whilst Person B’s surname
was presented second and to the right. We disaggregate the In–Out scheme data by
orderings to identify any potential presentation effect.
Table 6 presents the results from each scheme, outlining the average amounts al-
located to Person A, Person B and the mean difference between these allocations.
The mean differences between amounts allocated to Person A and Person B for all
schemes are presented graphically in Figure 2.
Scheme In–In Out–Out In–Out
Ordering Out–In In–Out
Person A Allocation £5.58 £5.73 £4.62 £5.85
Person B Allocation £4.42 £4.27 £5.39 £4.19
Difference £1.16*** £1.46*** -£0.77* £1.7***
(2.34) (2.43) (2.92) (3.29)
Observations 122 122 69 53
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Reported allocations
are means. ***, * denote significance at the 1% and 10% level.
p–values calculated from two–sided Sign Tests.
Table 6: Allocations in the Other–Other Games
Result 2 (Presentation Effect): When the surnames are of the same ethnic ori-
gin, subjects allocate approximately £1 more to the person listed first (Person A) than
to the person listed second (Person B).
Support. From Table 6, in both the In–In and Out–Out schemes, subjects give
significantly more to Person A than to Person B (p < 0.001 in both cases, Sign Tests).
Result 3 (Discrimination): When Person A and Person B have surnames of
different ethnic origins, subjects allocate more to the individual with the surname
of English origin. This is true even when the English surname is presented second.
However, we can only distinguish between the presentation effect and discrimination





































Note: Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 2: Difference in Allocations in the Other–Other
Games
Support. It can be seen from Table 6 that subjects give more to the person with a
surname of English origin in the In–Out scheme, with the difference in both In–Out
and Out–In orderings being significantly different from zero (p = 0.001 and p = 0.08,
Sign Tests).
Further support for Result 2 and Result 3 is presented in Table 7, which outlines
estimates from OLS and Tobit regressions. In each regression, the difference between
amounts allocated to Person A and Person B is the dependent variable. Observations
from the In–In scheme are taken as the baseline, and explanatory variables include
dummies controlling for choices made in the Out–Out scheme, and the orderings of
the In–Out scheme, taking values of 1 in each case (and 0 otherwise).
Dependent Variable: Difference in Allocations to Persons A and B
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Out–Out Scheme 0.295 0.3
(0.241) (0.242)
In–Out Ordering 0.534 0.548
(0.488) (0.492)
Out–In Ordering -1.932*** -1.942***
(0.419) (0.421)
Constant 0.975*** 1.164*** 0.978*** 1.164***
(0.163) (0.213) (0.164) (0.212)
Observations 366 366 366 366
Note: Observations from the In–In scheme are taken as the baseline.
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Re-
ported standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Models
(i) and (ii) are OLS regressions, (iii) and (iv) are Tobit regressions.
Table 7: Order Effects in Other–Other Allocation Decisions
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In support of Result 2, Table 7 outlines how the constant is estimated to be ap-
proximately 1 across models. The OLS regression results of model (ii) suggest that
Person A is allocated £1 more than Person B on average. No differences are found
between the In–In and Out–Out schemes, with the coefficient on the Out–Out dummy
never being significantly different from zero at conventional levels (p > 0.1, all cases).
In support of Result 3, the coefficient on the Out–In ordering dummy has a negative
and highly significant coefficient (p < 0.01). The estimates of model (ii) outline how,
in the Out–In ordering, a person of English origin is allocated around £2 more than
the individual with the surname of Muslim origin, once the ‘Presentation Effect’ is
accounted for.
Both Results 2 and 3 are in line with previous findings in the literature. The
presentation bias is well documented in the psychology literature. In particular,
there is considerable evidence of subjects choosing options presented on the left more
frequently than those presented on the right (Friedman et al., 1994; Weng & Cheng,
2000). However, although Result 3 is a replication of the findings of Chen & Li
(2009) and Turner (1978), and outlines how subjects differentiate between individuals
conditional on their ethnicity, it is not conclusive that they are discriminating. First,
as there is no Anonymous baseline from which to compare behaviour, the results
could equally imply either in–group favouritism or out–group negativity. Second, as
behaviour in the In–Out ordering is indistinguishable from behaviour in the In–In
and Out–Out scheme, we can only conclusively say that discrimination is observed
in the Out–In ordering. It is possible that this is a result of a ceiling effect in
how comfortable subjects feel when implementing inequitable outcomes. If subjects
already hit a ‘ceiling’ with respect to inequitable choices in the In–In scheme, then it
is unlikely we would observe differences between this scheme and the In–Out ordering,
as subjects would be unwilling to tolerate any additional inequality. Therefore, it is
likely that we only observe discrimination in the Out–In scheme as the motive to
discriminate works in the opposite direction to the presentation effect.
5 Structural model
To link our empirical analysis to behavioural theory, we model subjects’ behaviour
structurally. Following the model of Cox et al. (2007), it is assumed that each subject
has utility
u(x, y;α, θ, ε) =
{
α−1(xα + θ(e,m)yα) if α ∈ [−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1]
xyθ(e,m) if α = 0
, (1)
which is derived from her own payoff, x, and the receiver’s payoff, y. Her own
payoff consists of her participation fee, s = 2.5, plus the amount that she keeps for
herself: her initial endowment, ω = 10, minus the amount given to the receiver,
y ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 10}. The receiver’s payoff, y, is the amount the subject decides to
give. The social preference parameter, θ(e,m), is a function that captures the utility
weight the subject places on the receiver’s payoff. We can rewrite Equation 2 as
follows
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u(y;α, θ, ε) =
{
α−1((s+ ω − y)α + θ(e,m)yα) if α ∈ [−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1]
(s+ ω − y)yθ(e,m) if α = 0
. (2)
Implicit in our analysis is the assumption that subjects are making their decision
in isolation, or that they are ‘narrowly bracketing’ their decisions, and thus, are not
taking into account their own annual income, or the income of the receiver (Read
et al., 1999). Following Chen & Li (2009), we assume this parameter is a function of
the ethnicity, or identity, of both the subject and the receiver,
θ(e,m) = θ(1 + ae+ bm) + ε, (3)
where e and m are dummy variables, with e = 1 when the receiver has a surname
of English origin, and m = 1 when the receiver has a surname of Muslim origin, and 0
otherwise. Following the behavioural literature, we interpret parameter θ as capturing
the utility weight placed on the payoff of the receiver in a group neutral interaction
(Chen & Li, 2009). Thus, parameter θ represents baseline social preferences, or
preferences when the receiver is Anonymous. Parameters a and b, the English and
Muslim identity parameters, measure the additional effects of the receiver’s English
or Muslim ethnic origin on this weight. The function θ(e,m) is assumed identical
across subjects, except for an idiosyncratic error term, ε, which we assume to be
normally distributed with variance σ2. Thus, following the analysis of Apesteguia &
Ballester (forthcoming), we assume a random preference model rather than a random
utility model.
Specifying utility in this way is advantageous in comparison to more restricted
forms, as the model nests many commonly assumed functional forms: when α < 1,
indifference curves are strictly convex, when α = 1 indifference curves are linear and
subjects are altruistic. Indifference curves converge to Cobb-Douglas preferences as
α → 0. When θ(e,m) > 0, as α → ∞ preferences are Leontief.18 Utility reverts
to standard selfish preferences when θ = 0.19 Parameters could be obtained from
each of these nested forms by estimating the model with restrictions. However, we
let the model pick the parameter values that best fit the data and then test to see
if such restrictions would be valid. Appendix C describes the strategy employed to
estimate the parameters in Equation 2 structurally, closely following the procedure
of Cox et al. (2007).
Table 8 outlines the parameter estimates and standard errors. We begin by testing
a number of parameter restrictions. First, note that α is estimated to be both positive
and highly significant (p < 0.01, Wald Test). It is found to be significantly different
from one (p < 0.01, Wald Test), suggesting that linear, altruistic preferences do not
provide a good fit for the data. Similarly, θ is estimated to be positive and is highly
significant (p < 0.01, Wald Test), rejecting the notion of selfish preferences. While θ
is estimated to be larger than 1, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that it is equal
to 1 (p = 0.769, Wald Test).
18See Cox et al. (2007) for the proof.
19If α < 0, giving y = 0 would imply a payoff of u = −∞. As we observe a high number of y = 0 in the
data, we assume α ≥ 0.
16
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
Social Preference θ 1.11*** 0.39
English Identity a 0.65 0.67
Muslim Identity b -0.87** 0.36
Convexity α 0.72*** 0.03
Standard Deviation σ 2.31*** 0.28
Observations 122
Log-likelihood -422.53
Note: ***, ** denote significance at the 1% and 5%
level.
Table 8: Structural Parameter Estimates of Equation 2
From Table 8, the estimate of the English identity parameter, a, is not signifi-
cantly different from zero at conventional levels (p = 0.33, Wald Test), although the
Muslim identity parameter, b, is negative and highly significant (p = 0.014, Wald
Test). The null hypothesis that a = b can be rejected at the 5% level (p = 0.03,
Wald Test). Social preferences towards receivers with surnames of Muslim origin
are estimated to be around 87% smaller than social preferences towards those with
surnames of English origin and those who are Anonymous. As a is not estimated
to be significantly different from zero, subjects gain no additional utility from the
payoff of individuals with a surname of English origin in comparison to those who
are Anonymous. However, as b is estimated to be less than zero, subjects derive less
utility from the payoffs of individuals with surnames of Muslim origin in comparison
to those who are Anonymous. The estimates of a and b support Result 1 and the idea
that subjects exhibit out–group negativity rather than in–group favouritism. The
estimates suggest that out–group negativity is a consequence of group–contingent
social preferences.
6 Counterfactual analysis
A number of important questions arise from our results: to what extent could our
structural model explain the attitudes of the demographic of interest? Could our re-
sults provide an explanation for the reported discrimination against Muslims in both
the press and other studies? For example, the audit study of Ahmed & Hammarst-
edt (2008) finds Swedish landlords accepting potential tenants with Swedish names
more frequently than those with Muslim names. There is also anecdotal evidence
from Syal & Topping (2014) that British taxi customers request white British drivers
(“local” drivers) instead of Asian–Muslim drivers. In each case, the individual incurs
some cost, or trades–off some of her income, in order to complete a transaction with
someone they view as in–group, rather than someone from the out–group.
To address this question, consider an individual, p, who must choose with whom
to interact. They must select a strategy, s1, from the strategy set S1 = {In,Out},
where strategy s1 = In implies they interact with someone they perceive as an in-
group player (of English origin), pI , and s1 = Out with someone they perceive as an
out–group player (of Muslim origin), pO. We assume that pI and pO are identical
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except for p’s perception of their ethnicity.
From strategy s1 = In, p earns xin = x−c, and from s1 = Out she earns xout = x,
where x ≥ 0 and c ≥ 0. We assume it may be costly for p to choose an in–group
interaction, having to incur a cost in order to do so. This cost, c, can be thought of
as the cost of discriminating, or the amount of income individual p is willing to forego
in order to pursue in–group interactions. For example, when c > 0, the cost could
represent additional search costs associated with locating a shop run by an in–group
member, or the additional wait incurred when requesting an in–group taxi driver. It
could represent the cost associated with voting for a policy that is personally costly,
but would allow the individual to avoid out–group interactions. Alternatively, it could
represent the cost a landlord faces while waiting for an in–group tenant when only an
out–group tenant is currently available. Thus, c could range from very small to very
large; when c = 0, the decision is analogous to the Other–Other game. If s1 = In,
pI earns a payoff of yin > 0 and p
O earns zero. We also assume if s1 = Out, p
I earns









Note: p denotes the individual making the decision, pI denotes the in–group player, pO denotes the
out–group player. x and y denote the respective payoffs.
Figure 3: Extensive Form Representation
Assuming individual p’s utility, u : s1 → R, takes the form outlined in Equation 2,
with parameters equal to those estimated in Table 8, θ = 1.11, α = 0.72, b = −0.87,
a = 0, the extent to which she is willing to forego income in order to pursue in–
group interactions can be determined. Denoting s∗1 as the utility maximising strategy
choice, s∗1 = In when u(In) ≥ u(Out),
α−1((x− c)α + θ(1 + a)yαin) ≥ α−1(xα + θ(1 + b)yαout). (4)




x− [xα + θ (yα(b− a))]
1
α if yin = yout = y (5)
x− [xα + θ (yαout(1 + b)− yαin(1 + a))]
1
α if yin 6= yout. (6)
We can now consider when p will choose s∗1 = In for given discriminatory costs
and other players’ payoffs. It is particularly interesting to consider how this choice dif-
fers between individuals with group–contingent social preferences and those without
discriminatory tastes. Figure 4 plots Equations 5 and 6 graphically. Figure 4a plots
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the other players’ payoff y against the costs c. Figure 4b plots the difference between
the other players’ payoffs, d, where this difference is defined as d = yαin− yαout, against
costs c. In each figure the light shaded areas characterise where s∗1 = In is chosen
when the identity parameters are a = 0 and b = −0.87, as estimated in Section 5.
The dark shaded areas characterise choices of s∗1 = In when the identity parameters
are equal, a = b, or when social preferences are not group–contingent. Thus, we can
consider how behaviour diverges by comparing light and dark shaded areas.
When yin = yout = y, as shown in Figure 4a, p will only choose s
∗
1 = In when
a = 0 and b = −0.87. In this case there are no dark shaded areas because p is always
indifferent between whom she interacts with when the identity parameters are equal.
However, as characterised by the areas that are not shaded, even when p has group–
contingent social preferences, there still exist costs at which she would not be willing
to discriminate.
When yin 6= yout, as shown in Figure 4b, p may be willing to choose s∗1 = In
even when a = b, as highlighted by the dark shaded area. This is due to the positive
estimate of θ, which means that p would select the interaction that gave the highest
payoff to the other player, regardless of their group identity. Most interesting about
Figure 4b is that the light shaded area highlights how p would choose s∗1 = In for
negative values of d and even when the cost is high. This means that p will choose an
in–group interaction over an out–group interaction even when the interaction would
be more beneficial for an out–group player, and when the cost of selecting the in–
group interaction is high.
The conclusions drawn from this counterfactual simulation could provide an ex-
planation for why this particular demographic may support discriminatory policies,
even when those policies may produce outcomes that are costly to them, and could
provide insight into prior work that outlines discrimination towards Muslims. Al-
though statistical explanations cannot be ruled out in these examples, the analysis
highlights how individuals with group–contingent social preferences may be willing to
incur significant costs, or be prepared to trade–off large amounts of their own income,
in order to avoid out–group interactions.
7 Conclusion
We report evidence of individuals from an understudied subject pool – the poorest
people in England – discriminating against those with surnames of Muslim origin and
demonstrate this to be a consequence of social preferences being group–contingent.
Although discrimination against minorities is not a new finding per se, in the past
it has largely been attributed to in–group favouritism. Our study allows for the
disentangling of the mechanisms underlying such discrimination. We find that the
observed discrimination is most likely a result of out–group animosity rather than
in–group favouritism.
We focus on behaviour in a deprived neighbourhood because opinion polls have
shown that individuals with such demographics are most likely to support discrim-
inatory policies, and little was known about the motivation for such support. Our
research suggests that this may be because the social preferences of the deprived are












Note: c(y), if yin = yout = y










Note: c(d), if d = yαin − yαout
(b) Illustration of Equation 6
Note: Light shaded regions characterise where p chooses strategy In, s∗1 = In when a 6= b. Dark shaded
regions characterise where p chooses strategy In, s∗1 = In when a = b.
Figure 4: The Relationship Between Discrimination and
the Other Player’s Payoff
preferences come from, and when they start to develop, is beyond the scope of this
paper.
We advance the literature through the estimation of a structural model which we
exploit to perform a counterfactual simulation, modelling how these group–contingent
social preferences may cause individuals to incur costs in order to avoid out–group
interactions. In doing so we provide a potential explanation for the documented
attitudes of individuals from the demographic we study.
Whilst the results are suggestive, we acknowledge that care should be taken when
trying to generalise the results to the behaviour of other populations and identi-
ties. We deliberately did not conduct the study in affluent neighbourhoods because
individuals with such demographics are not normally associated with support for
discriminatory policies. Further, affluent individuals are more likely to be at work
during day light hours, introducing a selection bias in addition to the obvious income
effect that could play a role in decision making.
We also acknowledge that little can be said about those who opted out of the
experiment. For example, it may be that those who agreed to take part in the
experiment were more inclined to discriminate than those who did not. Alternatively,
as suggested by List (2006), those who participated in the experiment may be more
sensitive to experimental cues unaccounted for here. However, such selection bias
is unlikely to explain why we do not observe in–group favouritism. The results do,
however, serve as a sign that ethnic identities embedded within surnames can have a
significant effect on social preferences and behaviour.
Alternatively, the surnames we used could have signalled something else to the
subjects which we have failed to account for (Heckman, 1998). For example, although
we have focused exclusively on surnames as revealing ethnicity, Mitra & Ray (2014)
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outline how group conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India and Bangladesh
may instead be the result of status differences. In our study population Muslims
are a minority, and it may be that they are perceived as being of a lower social
status. Instead of ethnicity, subjects may identify with people along these status
lines. Whilst determining if this is the case is beyond the scope of this paper, the
result that subjects exhibit group-contingent social preferences would still hold; the
only aspect of the analysis that would change is what constitutes the social group.
In conclusion, we report evidence that the discriminatory behaviour of a previously
understudied demographic is a consequence of out–group negativity, rather than in–
group favouritism. We are able to determine this because of the inclusion of an
Anonymous baseline treatment, a crucial design aspect that is typically omitted.
Our results highlight how simple experiments can be used to understand the drivers
of discrimination and the willingness of individuals to engage in pro–social acts.
References
Ahmed, A. M. (2007), ‘Group Identity, Social Distance and Intergroup Bias’, Journal
of Economic Psychology 28(3), 324 – 337.
Ahmed, A. M. (2010a), ‘Muslim Discrimination: Evidence from Two Lost-Letter
Experiments’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology 40(4), 888–898.
Ahmed, A. M. (2010b), ‘What is in a Surname? The Role of Ethnicity in Economic
Decision Making’, Applied Economics 42(21), 2715–2723.
Ahmed, A. M., Andersson, L., Hammarstedt, M. et al. (2009), ‘Ethnic Discrimination
in the Market Place of Small Business Transfers’, Economics Bulletin 29(4), 3050–
3058.
Ahmed, A. M. & Hammarstedt, M. (2008), ‘Discrimination in the Rental Hous-
ing Market: A Field Experiment on the Internet’, Journal of Urban Economics
64(2), 362 – 372.
Akerlof, G. A. & Kranton, R. E. (2000), ‘Economics and Identity’, Quarterly Journal
of Economics 115(3), 715–753.
Apesteguia, J. & Ballester, A. M. (forthcoming), ‘Monotone Stochastic Choice Mod-
els: The Case of Risk and Time Preferences’, Journal of Political Economy .
Becker, G. S. (1971), The Economics of Discrimination, University of Chicago Press.
Bernhard, H., Fischbacher, U. & Fehr, E. (2006), ‘Parochial Altruism in Humans’,
Nature 442(7105), 912–915.
Boffey, D. & Helm, T. (2016), ‘Vote Leave Embroiled in Race Row Over Turkey




Booth, A. L., Leigh, A. & Varganova, E. (2012), ‘Does Ethnic Discrimination Vary
Across Minority Groups? Evidence from a Field Experiment’, Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics 74(4), 547–573.
Carter, H. & Midlane, T. (2012), ‘Rochdale Violence Raises Fears Over Racial
Tensions in North–West England’, The Guardian, Website. Accessed August 2014.
URL: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/feb/24/rochdale-violence-fears-
racial-tensions
Chen, R. & Chen, Y. (2011), ‘The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selec-
tion’, American Economic Review 101(6), 2562–89.
Chen, Y. & Li, S. X. (2009), ‘Group Identity and Social Preferences’, American
Economic Review 99(1), 431–57.
Cox, J. C., Friedman, D. & Gjerstad, S. (2007), ‘A Tractable Model of Reciprocity
and Fairness’, Games and Economic Behavior 59(1), 17–45.
Cuzick, J. (1985), ‘A Wilcoxon–Type Test for Trend’, Statistics in Medicine 4(4), 543–
547.
Drouvelis, M. & Nosenzo, D. (2013), ‘Group Identity and Leading-by-Example’, Jour-
nal of Economic Psychology 39, 414–425.
Engel, C. (2011), ‘Dictator Games: A Meta Study’, Experimental Economics
14(4), 583–610.
Falk, A. & Fischbacher, U. (2006), ‘A Theory of Reciprocity’, Games and Economic
Behavior 54(2), 293–315.
Falk, A. & Zehnder, C. (2013), ‘A City–Wide Experiment on Trust Discrimination’,
Journal of Public Economics 100, 15–27.
Feltovich, N. (2003), ‘Nonparametric Tests of Differences in Medians: Comparison of
the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney and Robust Rank–Order Tests’, Experimental Eco-
nomics 6(3), 273–297.
Fershtman, C. & Gneezy, U. (2001), ‘Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An
Experimental Approach’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(1), 351–377.
Friedman, H. H., Herskovitz, P. J. & Pollack, S. (1994), The Biasing Effects of Scale–
Checking Styles on Response to a Likert Scale, in ‘Proceedings of the American
statistical association annual conference: survey research methods’, Vol. 792.
Goette, L., Huffman, D. & Meier, S. (2006), ‘The Impact of Group Membership on
Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: Evidence using Random Assignment to Real
Social Groups’, American Economic Review 96(2), 212–216.
Guala, F., Mitten, L. & Ploner, M. (2013), ‘Group Membership, Team Preferences,
and Expectations’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 86, 183–190.
22
Harrison, G. W. & List, J. A. (2004), ‘Field Experiments’, Journal of Economic
Literature 42(4), 1009–1055.
Heckman, J. J. (1998), ‘Detecting Discrimination’, Journal of Economic Perspectives
12(2), 101–116.
Hinsliff, G. (2016), ‘The Tories Attempts to Smear Sadiq Khan are Repellent’, The
Guardian, Website. Accessed July 2016.
URL: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/22/tories-attempt-
smear-sadiq-khan-repellent
Holm, H. J. (2000), ‘Gender-Based Focal Points’, Games and Economic Behavior
32(2), 292–314.
Ioannou, C. A., Qi, S. & Rustichini, A. (2015), ‘Group Payoffs as Public Signals’,
Journal of Economic Psychology 48, 89–105.
Kaas, L. & Manger, C. (2012), ‘Ethnic Discrimination in Germany’s Labour Market:
A Field Experiment’, German Economic Review 13(1), 1–20.
List, J. A. (2006), ‘The Behavioralist Meets the Market: Measuring Social Prefer-
ences and Reputation Effects in Actual Transactions’, Journal of Political Economy
114(1), 1–37.
Mateos, P., Webber, R. & Longley, P. A. (2007), The Cultural, Ethnic and Lin-
guistic Classification of Populations and Neighbourhoods using Personal Names.
University College London, Working Paper.
Milibank, D. (2015), ‘Donald Trump is a Bigot and a Racist’, The Washington Post,
Website. Accessed January 2016.
URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/donald-trump-is-a-bigot-and-a-
racist/2015/12/01/a2a47b96-9872-11e5-8917-653b65c809eb˙story.html
Mitra, A. & Ray, D. (2014), ‘Implications of Economic Theory of Conflict: Hindu–
Muslim Violence in India’, Journal of Political Economy 122(4), 719–765.
Page, B. (2009), ‘British Attitudes to Immigration in the 21st Century’, Migration
Policy Institute.
Phelps, E. S. (1972), ‘The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism’, American Eco-
nomic Review 62(4), 659–661.
Read, D., Loewenstein, G. & Rabin, M. (1999), ‘Choice Bracketing’, Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty 19(1), 171–197.
Ruffle, B. J. & Sosis, R. (2006), ‘Cooperation and the In-Group-Out-Group Bias: A
Field test on Israeli Kibbutz Members and City Residents’, Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organisation 60(2), 147–163.
23
Syal, R. & Topping, A. (2014), ‘Rochdale Taxi Firm Admits Providing White Drivers
on Request’, The Guardian, Website. Accessed November 2014.
URL: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/oct/21/rochdale-taxi-firm-
white-drivers-on-request
Thompson, D. (2016), ‘Who Are Donald Trump’s Supporters, Really?’, The Atlantic,
Website. Accessed July 2016.
URL: http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/who-are-donald-
trumps-supporters-really/471714/
Townsend, M. (2012), ‘Voters More likely to Back an Anti–Muslim Party than Reject
it’, The Guardian, website. Accessed January 2016.
URL: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/sep/16/voters-support-anti-
immigrant-party
Turner, J. C. (1978), Social Categorization and Social Discrimination in the Minimal
Group Paradigm, in H. Tajfel, ed., ‘Differentiation Between Social Groups: Stud-
ies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations’, London: Academic Press,
pp. 101–140.
Weng, L.-J. & Cheng, C.-P. (2000), ‘Effects of Response Order on Likert–Type Scales’,
Educational and Psychological Measurement 60(6), 908–924.
Whitt, S. & Wilson, R. K. (2007), ‘The Dictator Game, Fairness and Ethnicity in
Postwar Bosnia’, American Journal of Political Science 51(3), 655–668.
Wright, O. (2016), ‘Nigel Farage Accused of Deploying Nazi–Style Propaganda as




Yamagishi, T. & Kiyonari, T. (2000), ‘The Group as the Container of Generalized
Reciprocity’, Social Psychology Quarterly 63(2), 116–132.
24
A Experimental Appendix
A.1 Experimental instructions - Part 1
Instructions (Part 1)
In Part 1 you will be asked to make three choices. These choices will be referred to as Choice
1, Choice 2 and Choice 3. In each Choice, you will be randomly matched to two people chosen
from a list compiled from the Edited Electoral Register for the Rochdale area. These two people will
be called Person A and Person B. Person A and Person B will not be required to make a decision.
In each Choice, the surnames of Person A and Person B will be revealed. No other information
about these people can be given. Even if the surnames are identical between Choices, the people will
be different.
In each Choice, you will be asked how to split 10 pounds between Person A and Person B.
You can allocate the 10 pounds however you like, as long as the allocation adds up to 10 pounds and
the amount given to each person is in whole pounds. You cannot allocate money to yourself.
Once the study is complete, one of these three Choices will be chosen at random, and Person A
and Person B from that Choice will receive payment in cash.
The Person A and Person B that are chosen to receive payment, will not know they have taken
part in this experiment until they receive a letter with the amount of money you have allocated them.
The amount you decide to send will be placed in an envelope and will be delivered through Person
A’s and Person B’s door. Person A and Person B will not learn any information about you.
You will not earn any money in Part 1.
When a Choice is chosen, the amount of money Person A and B will earn in pounds will be:
The amount that you allocate them.
To make sure you fully understand what is asked of you, please complete the three practice questions
below. Once you have finished, please let the instructor know so that they can check your answers:
1. How much will you earn in Part 1?_________________________
2. If you allocate Person A 2 pounds:
(a) How much will Person A earn?________________
(b) How much will Person B earn?_______________
3. If you allocate Person A 8 pounds:
(a) How much will Person A earn?________________
(b) How much will Person B earn?_______________
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A.2 Other–other decision sheets
Part 1 Answer Sheet
Choice 1
c









Person B’s surname is_________________________
c
Write the amount of pounds you would like to allocate to each Person in the
boxes below. The amounts allocated must add up to 10.




Once you have made your decision please turn over.
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A.3 Experimental instructions - Part 2
Instructions (Part 2)
In Part 2 you will be given £10. You will then be matched to a person randomly chosen from a list
compiled from the Edited Electoral Register for the Rochdale area. This person will be called your
match. Your match is not the same person as anyone you allocated money to in Part 1. Before you
make your decision I have to tell you the surname of your match.
Their surname is ________________. I can’t reveal any other information about your
match.
You will be required to make a single decision. Your match will not be required to make a decision.
You will be asked how many of the 10 pounds that you have been given you would like to send to
your match. You can make any choice between 0 and 10. Your choice must be in whole pounds and
not pence. The amount you decide to send will be placed in an envelope and will be delivered through
your match’s door with an accompanying letter. Your match will not know they have taken part in
this experiment until they receive a letter with the amount of money you decide to send them. Your
match will not learn your surname or any information about you.
The amount of money you earn in Part 2 in pounds will be :
10 minus the number of pounds you send.
The amount of money your match will earn in pounds will be:
The amount that you send them.
To make sure you fully understand what is asked of you, please complete the three practice questions
below. Once you have finished, please let the instructor know so that they can check your answers:
1. If you send £0 how much will:
(a) you earn in Part 2?_________________________
(b) your match earn?________________
2. If you send £5 how much will:
(a) you earn in Part 2?_________________________
(b) your match earn?________________
3. If you send £10 how much will:
(a) you earn in Part 2?_________________________
(b) your match earn?________________
4. Does your match know they are taking part?__________
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A.4 Dictator game decision sheet
Part 2 Answer Sheet
c




Your match’s surname is_________________________
c
Write the amount of pounds you would like to send to your match in the
box below.
Once you have made your decision please turn over.
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B Statistical Appendix
B.1 Survey and responses
here
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev.
Male, 1 if yes 122 0.443 0.499
Married, 1 if yes 121 0.372 0.634
No. Children 113 0.628 0.485
Employed 119 0.429 0.696
Income∗ 100 0.36 0.612
Education† 117 0.906 0.83
Housing benefit, 1 if yes 121 0.678 0.469
Years Living in Rochdale 120 26.142 16.353
Beliefs∗∗ 103 3.738 3.106
Note: Observations differ due to missing entries.
0 if unemployed, 1 if employed, 2 if retired.
∗0 if income < £10000, 1 if £10000 < income ≤ £20,0000, 2
if £20000 < income ≤ £30,0000 .
†0 if no qualifications, 1 if GCSE level, 2 if A–level, 3 if Degree,
4 if postgraduate.
** Subjects’ belief about the experimenter’s expectation of their
behaviour in the Dictator Game.
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C Structural Appendix
C.1 Constructing the likelihood function
Fixing the parameters α, θ, a, b, for each amount sent y ∈ {0, 1, ..., 10} we can
determine the critical values of ε where the subjects utility maximising choice changes,
εy. This is because the utility maximising choice of y, y
∗, varies with ε. The dictator
will choose to send an amount y over y + 1 up until,
u(y;α, θ, a, b, εy) = u(y + 1;α, θ, a, b, εy). (7)
Rearranging for εy gives
εy =
(s+ ω − y)α − (s+ ω − y − 1)α
(y + 1)α − yα
− θ(1 + ae+ bm) (8)







(s+ ω − y)α − (s+ ω − y − 1)α
(y + 1)α − yα
− θ(1 + ae+ bm)
)
(9)
When ε ∈ (εy−1, εy), y∗ = y. The probability of choosing y∗ = y can then be
determined from the cumulative distribution function of the error term. Where f(z)
is the density function, and F (z) the cumulative distribution, the probability that
the dictator chooses y∗ = 0 is the probability that ε ∈ (−∞, ε0), or
Pr[y∗ = 0|α, θ, a, b, σ] =
∫ ε0
−∞
f(z)dz = F (ε0). (10)
The probability the dictator chooses y∗ = y ∈ {1, 2, ..., 9} is
Pr[y∗ = y|α, θ, a, b, σ] =
∫ εy
εy−1
f(z)dz = F (εy)− F (εy−1), (11)
and the probability of choosing y∗ = 10 is
Pr[y∗ = 10|α, θ, a, b, σ] =
∫ ∞
ε9
f(z)dz = 1− F (ε9).
The likelihood function, as we have k = 122 observations, is therefore
L(α, θ, a, b, σ) =
122∏
k=1
Pr[yk = y;α, θ, a, b, σ]. (12)
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